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Brian Langille*

Why the Right-Freedom Distinction Matters
to Labour Lawyers-And to All Canadians

This lecture is about very basic legal ideas such as rights, freedoms, and the
distinction between them. It makes the argument that clear thinking about these
basic ideas is required and that when these ideas are neglected we have a recipe
for real legal confusion. More than that, a failure to attend to these basic concepts
and their relationship can produce, as it has in recent Supreme Court of Canada
Charter cases on "Freedom of Association," a real threat to the fundamental
freedoms of all Canadians.
Cet article traite de concepts juridiques trds 4/dmentaires : droits, libert6s, et ce
qui distingue les uns des autres. Lauteur avance I'argument qu'il faut envisager
ces concepts avec lucidite et que les ndgliger ne peut que mener 6 une profonde
confusion juridique. Qui plus est, si on n'accorde pas j ces concepts 6l/mentaires
et j la relation qu'ils ont entre eux I'importance voulue, le r6sultat risque fort d'&tre
une menace r6elle aux libertbs fondamentales de tous les Canadiens, ainsi que
Pont ddmontrd des arr6ts r6cents de la Cour supreme sur la libertd d'association.

I. An argumentfor Innis
II. An overview of the argument
III. The argument
1. Private law as the startingpoint for understanding rights and
freedoms
2. Statutes and the creation of derivative rightsfrom freedoms
3. The constitution and the creation of derivative rights
4. Why the distinction between constitutional rights andfreedoms
matters to all Canadians

Faculty of Law, University of Toronto and Innis Christie Visiting Professor in Labour and
Employment Law at the Schulich School of Law 2011. I must acknowledge both the stellar research
assistance and insightful arguments of Benjamin Oliphant of the University of Toronto. The 2011 Innis
Christie Public Lecture in Labour and Employment Law was presented in Halifax on 4 November
2011.
*
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I. An argumentfor Innis
Innis Christie was my teacher, my mentor, my colleague, and my greatest
academic supporter-he was unrelentingly generous to me and on my
behalf. He is the reason I am a labour lawyer and why I am an academic.
I am profoundly, as are many, in his eternal debt. It is one of the true
honours of my life to be asked to give this lecture in his name.
A lot can and has been said, and said well, about the magnificent arc
of his career. Innis Christie has. been, and long will be, justly celebrated
and acknowledged for his teaching, for his shaping of generations of
law students, for his academic writing, for his academic leadershipnot only as dean but throughout his career, for his public service, for his
strengths as an adjudicator, for his national reputation as an arbitrator, and
as Harry Arthurs reminded us in last year's lecture, for his influence on
the very way people think about his field of law. But at the core of all
of this accomplishment was the real person, Innis. He embodied all that
our profession aspires to-he was smart, he was principled, he had great
judgement, he worked hard, he asked a lot of himself and he expected
others to do the same. He was decent, he was humane, he was downto-earth, he was competitive, and he loved to laugh. In a world which
increasingly seems to have far too few of them, he was a hero.
Martin Luther King famously said on the Washington Mall that he
had a dream of a day when people "would not be judged by the colour of
their skin." Most people remember that. Sometimes they forget what Dr.
King went on to say-"but by the content of their character." Innis was
a man of sterling character. The example he set by simply being Innis is,
I believe, why we remember and honour him. Innis showed that being a
good man was not simply compatible with a great career in the law, but
essential to it.
In this lecture I will make an argument. It is an argument I hope that
Innis would have liked. I am not sure if he would have agreed with it.
But I do think he would have liked the cut of its jib. I think this because
the argument is a bit old fashioned, because it tries to take legal thinking
seriously on its own terms, because its theory is close to the ground and
is found in some very simple, first year, law school sorts of ideas, because
some fundamental labour law issues are in play, and because it claims that
what is at stake is important for all Canadians. I also like to think Innis
would have liked the cut of its jib because it is somewhat contrarian-it
goes against the grain of much current thought in high places, such as the
Supreme Court of Canada. The fact the powerful people in high places say
things does not make them true. I know Innis shared that view.
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Finally, I like to think Innis would have liked the cut of this argument's
jib because this argument is made in the faith that clear thinking will, in
the end, win out. Innis was not nave-he did not think clear thinking was
all that the world needed to become a better place. But he understood that
without clear thinking, nothing worthwhile will come our way.
II. An overview of the argument
Now, before beginning the argument, a word about what this argument is
about and where it is going, and why I think it is important.
On October 12th of this year the Federal Minister of Labour, Lisa
Raitt, issued the following edict in connection with the Air Canada
flight attendants negotiations: "I.. .hereby... direct the Canada Industrial
Relations Board to either impose a new collective agreement on the
parties or impose final binding arbitration to resolve outstanding terms
of the collective agreement." This order ended with an Imperial flourish
-"In witness whereof the Minister of Labour has hereto set her hand this
12 th day of October 2011."'
My view is that this is entirely chilling and we should all wake up to
that fact. In Putin's Russia, or in China, overt connections between the
state executive and powerful private interests are common and respect
for the fundamental freedoms of ordinary citizens hard to find. It is not
supposed to be that way here. 2
If you find this evaluation a bit strong I ask you to consider what
immediately preceded this edict. This was the Ministers' claim that there
was a serious "essential services" issue-that is "an immediate and serious
danger to the safety or health of the public" 3-which was to be referred
to the Board and which would have had the effect of delaying a strike.
I view it as a serious comment on the current state of our democracy
when a Minister of the Crown can, almost winking at us, make such a
transparently unfounded and equally transparently motivated claim, in any
circumstances. Let alone when serious issues and fundamental freedoms
are at stake. Perhaps the worst part is the reaction of a large part of the

I. The order was allegedly made pursuant to s 107 of the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2
[Canada Labour Code]. The document can be found on the Canadian Industrial Relations Board
website at <http://www.cirb-ccri.gc.ca/download-telechargement/ministerial-referral_107.pdf>.
2. The parties found it chilling too-for they immediately agreed to privately arbitrate their
differences-rather than run the risk of having an arbitrator or an agreement imposed upon them.
3. See CanadaLabourCode, supra note 1, s 87.4.
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Canadian media and the Canadian public-that this is normal. "I'm all
right Jack" seems the new morality of our time.4
The good news is that, in my view, this sort of exercise of state power
is illegal. This is what the most important cases we read in law school
-Roncarelli v Duplessis,5 Smith and Rhuland,6 the Insite Safe Injection
case 7-tell us. And, as these cases show unlike Russia or China, we still
have a real judicial system with the power and will to enforce our basic
ideas about living in a society governed by law, and not executive diktat.
But there is a complication in connection with cases like Air Canada.
The argument I make here is that we are currently at risk when it comes
to getting Air Canada, and similar cases, straightened out. This is because
they have a constitutional dimension and any challenge to Minister Raitt's
actions will be argued, as with the Post Office case and others, as a 2(d)
'freedom of association" case. It is my view that the Supreme Court of
Canada has unnecessarily but darkly muddied the waters of 2(d), and that
as a result we are in grave danger when it comes to the Court's ability
to get this one right. What I wish to do in this lecture is to sharpen our
thinking about freedom of association and to clarify the waters. All in an
effort to remove what I see as a clear and present danger to our ability to
do what has to be done in situations such as the Air Canada fiasco.'
The argument is about the most important labour law decisions of my
lifetime-Dunmore,' B. C. Health," and Fraser" For non-labour lawyers
in the audience, let me briefly note that in the 2007 decision in B.C. Health
Services the Supreme Court of Canada, following an opening it had
This is something to which I will return-the idea that simply because the actions of others
4.
have an impact on us that we have a right to object to that behaviour-or that the government must
intervene to shelter us. Even if all that is happening is that those others are doing what they are free to
do in a way which does not affect the legal rights of the rest of us.
Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121 (Premier of Province cannot order Liquor Commission
5.
to revoke a liquor licence for a reason irrelevant to the purposes of the licencing regime-because the
holder exercised his freedom to support Jehovah Witnesses).
Smith & RhulandLimitedv The Queen, ex rel BriceAndrews, [1953] 2 SCR 95 (Labour Relations
6.
Board acted illegally when it exercised its discretion not to certify a union for a reason irrelevant to
purposes of the statute granting power to certify unions-because Secretary General of the Union
exercised freedom to be to be member of communist party).
Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, 336 DLR (4th) 385. (Minister
7.
of Health acted illegally when he exercised his discretion not to renew a statutory exemption for
safe injection clinic for reasons which bear no relation to, and in fact undermine, the purposes of the
statutory regime granting the discretion.)
If we succeed in achieving this clarity we will also have laid bare what the cost of the dominant
8.
'I'm all right Jack" attitude of our times really is.
9. Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94,[2001] 3 SCR 1016 [Dunmore].
10. Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector BargainingAssn v British Columbia, 2007
SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [B.C. Health].
I1. Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser,2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser].
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created in Dunmore in 2001, dramatically overturned 20 years of Charter
jurisprudence and held that our constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association (2(d)) protects collective bargaining. As most people put it,
the Court held that there is a constitutional "right" to collectively bargain
in Canada. The 2011 Frasercase affirms this holding. But in those cases
the court expressly did not decide whether there is a constitutional "right"
to strike. It left that question open. This is the question which is squarely
on the table now. This is the issue which has been placed front and centre
by the actions of our Federal government in Air Canada and elsewhere.'"
The problem is that these very important Charter cases are very
confused in their thinking. This confusion stands in the way of the Court
getting these abuses of power we witness in connection with Air Canada
under legal control. They will, if not addressed, block a much needed
response, equal in power to Roncarelli and Smith v. Rhuland.
But my interest in these cases is even deeper. Their potential to do
harm is very basic, and extends beyond Air Canada type cases, because
they are a threat to our rights and freedoms in general. That is, I believe
that what they say is quite wrong-and wrong in a way which will affect
all of our fundamental freedoms and rights.
I believe this is because these cases misunderstand a crucial
distinction - the distinction between rights and freedoms-in a way which
is dangerous for all Canadians, not simply as workers, but as citizens.
The Supreme Court of Canada not only confuses this distinction, which
I seek to defend, but purports to be positively hostile to it. In Fraserthe
majority actually says: "the Charter cannot be separated into two kinds
of guarantees-rights and freedoms."' This is, in my view, a really very
unfortunate sentence to have been uttered by your Supreme Court. Akin,
only much more serious, to saying there is no difference between a pop
fly and a home run. Even the Supreme Court of Canada cannot make that

12. On this issue, see the essays in the special edition of the Canadian Labour and Employment Law
Journal, Brian Langille, ed, "Is There a Constitutional Right to Strike in Canada" (2009-2010) 15
CLELJ 1.
13. Fraser,supra note II at para 67. (The majority also quotes previous cases in which the term
"right" was used when the Court meant "freedom," and vice versa, such as the "freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment" (from Charkaoui v Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at
para 107, [2007] 1 SCR 350). It states, as a rebuttal to Rothstein J, that "many of the rights in sections 7
to 12 do not entitle individuals to any form of state action." This is true, but they provide rights against
state action-they place a duty on the government to not do something, which is perfectly compatible
with the proper conception of what a "right" entails. Because freedom describes a state in which I can
choose to do or not do something, and all private actors can do likewise, a freedom obviously imposes
a duty on the state to not interfere with that activity, but it imposes no duties whatsoever on other
private actors, unless we are to turn that "freedom" into a derivative "right." See below.
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so by simply saying it. There is a grammar to concepts. You do not get to
make them up.
Now, how will the argument proceed? This argument starts with some
very basic reminders about private law, i.e. common law. It does so because
we have to in order to see what is really going on in our constitutional
cases. Some of our most important cases in the history of Canadian labour
law-Hersees of Woodstockl4 and Pepsi Cola' will be prominent in my
examples-are about these very basic private law ideas. The problem is
that sometimes these very basic and important ideas get lost-go AWOL.
Sometimes they show back up again. Legal life is always much better
when they do not go AWOL.
Then, I will argue that these very basic common law ideas are required
to understand the basics of our labour law statutes such as the Ontario
LabourRelations Act or the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act. I will show how
our often-lost-sight-of, our AWOL, basic ideas make clear exactly what
our labour law statutes are up to.
Finally, I make the claim that our basic ideas not only make our
common law and statutes clear, but they are also required to make sense of
all of our recent constitutional litigation regarding freedom of association
-i.e. to really make sense of what is going on in B. C. Health and Fraser.
My argument is that we will never be able to see what is so dangerously
wrong with the Fraserdecision-and never be in a position to right the
wrongs of Air Canada-without our AWOL basic ideas coming home and
shedding their light on these most important cases in our constitutional
law.
Thus the argument goes in a number of steps-but it also goes common
law, statute law, constitutional law. And it ends with an exhortation to all
Canadians to appreciate the implication of the argument for the exercise of
their constitutional freedoms.

14. Hersees of Woodstock Ltd v Goldstein (1963), 38 DLR 2d 449 (Ont CA) [Hersees].
15. RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-ColaCanadaBeverages (West) Ltd, 2002 SCC 8, [2002] 1 SCR 156
[Pepsi-Cola].
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III. The argument
1. Private law as the startingpointfor understandingfreedoms and
rights
The first basic idea which often goes missing these days is the distinction
between rights and freedoms. 6 There is, in spite of what the Supreme
Court says, a basic distinction between freedoms and rights. Rights have
to do with what I can demand that you do (pay me the $1000 price you
agreed to in our contract) or not do (not assault me). Freedoms have to do
with what I am free to do or not do (to speak or not-to think this or not
this-to join a union or not-to worship a God or not).
It makes no sense-it is conceptual nonsense-to say "I have a right
to free speech." Rather say, "I have freedom of speech." Of course people,
and lawyers, and judges DO say the former all the time-they speak of a
right to free speech, or a right to freedom of association, and so on, when
what they are talking about are freedoms. This is one of our problems.
This common way of talking is perhaps explained in our private law,
but not excused, by the fact that my freedom of speech, for example, is in
fact protected by a "perimeter" of what are correctly called rights. So, you
cannot put your hand over my mouth to stop me exercising my freedom
to speak-or send a bunch of thugs round to beat me up because I have
joined a union-those would be torts-assaults. These tort and other
normally applicable "background" legal rules do in fact construct much of
the relevant legal structure in place when we speak of free speech.' 7
Thus, it might be natural to speak of a "right" to free speech. But
natural as it is, it is more than potentially misleading because that to which
I actually have a right is that you not assault me (when I am exercising my
freedom of speech or association). These are two separate legal mattersmy freedom concerning what I do, and my right about what you do.
So, that is the first very basic, but often lost sight of, idea-the
right/freedom distinction.

16. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946). For an instruction manual see John Finnis,
"Some Professional Fallacies about Rights" (1971) 4 Adelaide LR 377. See also Brian Langille, "The
Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can Get out of It", (2009) 54 McGill
LJ 177 [Langille, "Freedom ofAssociation Mess"] at 198-201.
17. I do not take any position on the basic justification for this background set of rules-in a Kantian
system of equal liberty, for example, or elsewhere. But see Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom:
Kants Legal and PoliticalPhilosophy(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). I merely appeal
to what all lawyers know-that our rules are ones which we all have equally (i.e. are formally equal in
their application). This is their great strength and, as all labour lawyers know, their weakness as well.
See infra.

150 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Even more primitive is the second and often lost distinction. This is
the distinction between your actions which affect me or my interests, on
the one hand, and your actions which violate my legal rights, on the other.
For example, I am free to start a restaurant in Truro. So are you. My
restaurant may have a big impact upon you, your interests, and your
exercise of your freedoms. If I start a restaurant and it is very good it
may drive your not very good restaurant out of business." This has a
large impact upon you but you have no legal claim against me. I have not
violated your rights. My exercise of my freedom has had an impact upon
your exercise of your freedom and upon your material interests. But here
the freedoms simply contend-or contest-in fact. They do not conflict
in law.
So, here are the two very basic but often lost ideas-(1) the distinction
between my actions which affect you or your interests and my actions
which violate your rights.' And (2) the distinction between rights and
freedoms.
There is a third idea which is often lost sight of and intimately
connected to the first two. It follows from our ideas that because we cannot
even get into court we have no worries about a judge trying to "balance"
the exercise of our freedoms. The idea of ajudge weighing up our interests
is foreign to our understanding of contending freedoms. We do not want
and do not expect a judge to weigh up which of two competing restaurants
in Truro deserves to "win" out. But, so too, if you do violate my rights then
there is also no balancing or proportionality involved. We do not want,
and do not get, a judge saying things like-"Yes, the defendants burned
down your restaurant, but you must understand that there they had a vital
interest at stake-their business was suffering, they had rent to pay, and
three kids in college-that led them to that course of action and it falls to

18. Or, given the "success' of McDonalds," etc., the other way round-my not very good restaurant
may drive your excellent establishment out of business.
19. Note that impacts can be positive or negative. That is, we all inflict gains as well as losses upon
each other all of the time without attracting any legal scrutiny or cause for alarm. So, if I have a hotel
in our town, and your restaurant is awarded three Michelin stars, and my hotel business does very well
indeed, and all thanks to you, there is no legal claim available. There is enrichment here-but it is not
unjust enrichment. I have violated none of your rights and our freedoms merely co-exist. (Note: it may
even be a story of mutual gains.)
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me to balance your interests with theirs," Rather, we go from violation of
right to vindication of it, unmediated by any balancing tests.20
Here is a very famous Canadian labour law example of our ideas
lost in action. 2 1 It is a labour case involving what people used to call
"secondary picketing." In 1963 the Ontario Court of Appeal issued its
decision in Hersees of Woodstock.22 The facts were simple-there was
a labour dispute at a shirt manufacturing plant. The union approached
a retail store selling the shirts and asked them to stop selling. The store
owner refused. The union picketed the store-two men walked up and
down on the public sidewalk with a sign which read "Attention shoppers:
Deacon Brothers [the name of the struck manufacturer] sportswear sold at
Hersees [the name of the shop]" and handed out leaflets. All very peaceful.
All very Canadian.
The Ontario Court of Appeal began its judgement by making a mess
of an analysis of some economic torts (especially inducing breach of
contract). I pause to note that this particular sort of weak thinking was
something Innis was an expert on exposing. But then the court, famously
-almost wonderfully-said the following:
But even assuming that the picketing carried on by the [union] was
lawful in the sense that it was merely peaceful picketing for the purpose
only of communicating information, I think it should be restrained. The
[store owner] has a right lawfully to engage in its business of retailing
merchandise to the public. In the City of Woodstock where that business

is being carried on, the picketing for the reasons already stated, has
caused or is likely to cause damage to the [store owner]. Therefore,

the right, if there be such a right, of the [union] to engage in secondary
picketing of [the store owner's] premises must give way to [the store

owner's] right to trade; the former, assuming it to be a legal right, is
exercised for the benefit of a particular class only while the latter is a
right far more fundamental and of far greater importance.... 23

This is, based on what we have just noted, obvious nonsense. Our three
lost ideas show why. First, the store owner does not have a "right" to
"engage in its business"; it has the freedom to do so. The workers do not
20. Another and deeper point-this is so because if there is a violation of a right then costs and
benefits are in fact irrelevant altogether (and thus there is nothing to balance). If while I am away
you break into my house and host a nice dinner party, but clean up perfectly afterwards so that I have
suffered no loss (the place is even cleaner than I left it)-that is still a violation of my right. And, again,
it does not matter in law if it really matters to you in fact that you host a nice dinner party (your whole
career will be ruined if you do not host a party for your boss). The law is correctly unconcerned with
all of that.
21. Or is it lost ideas in action?
22. Supra note 14.
23. Hersees, supra note 14 at 454.
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have a "right" to picket; they have the freedom to do so. Second, these
freedoms cannot and do not conflict in law at all. They merely contend
in fact. Third, when there is no legal violation of a right ("even assuming
the picketing was lawful...") we do not need and should not get to any
balancing test at all.24
The problem with a judge saying that the right to trade is "far more
fundamental" than the right of the workers to picket is not that it is wrong
(although you may agree with me that freedom of speech is right up
there with the best of them in terms of "fundamentalness")-it is, rather,
that it is an insult to the basics of our legal system, which we have just
reviewed, for a judge to say anything at all. There is no judicial work
to be done here. Yes, the store owner's interests may have been affected
(some consumers stop buying in solidarity)-but not its rights. Just as the
store owner carrying on selling the shirts may have a negative impact on
the interests of the striking workers. But this is all legally meaningless
-there is nothing to adjudicate here. This is simply a case of contending
freedoms. There is no violation of a right. But we need our basic ideas to
see this.25 When we do keep our eye on the legal basics we can see that
Hersees is just our "two restaurants in Truro" problem. And we need and
want the same solution to it here as we do there.
But sometimes our lost ideas, like prodigal sons, find their way home
as they did in Canada in the 2002 Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Pepsi Cola26-after 40 years in the wilderness. In that case the Hersees
decision was relegated to the legal scrap heap. Pepsi Cola is a beautiful
decision.
The key facts were basically as in Hersees-strikingworkers from a
Pepsi plant picketed retail outlets selling Pepsi products. The employer
objected in the courts, relying on Hersees. But the approach taken in Pepsi
is exactly the opposite to that taken in Hersees and explicitly so. It is an
approach which goes back to our legal basics and gets them right. The lost

24. This is leaving aside the fact that here the balancing is no balancing, rather a complete trumping
of the freedom to picket by the freedom to trade.
25. In a society which takes freedom of speech and freedom to trade seriously there is nothing
legally interesting at all when, say, a group of students peacefully pickets a local fashion store to
protest use of seal skin coats from Canada, or clothing made in sweatshops abroad. And if consumers
react, that is not a problem or even a legally relevant fact-that is the exercise of another freedom. It
is the world working as it should. In the absence of a tort or some other legal wrong there is no legal
issue to be litigated. And in a free and democratic society the last thing we want is a judge "balancing"
these freedoms.
26. Supra note 15.
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ideas find their way home.27 The Supreme Court said that correct approach
was to hold that picketing (even "secondary") is to be permitted unless it
involves a legal wrong (a crime or a tort). This is, as we have seen, surely
correct. There is no need for further "balancing" at all. For a court, or
anyone else, other than the parties, and those such as consumers to whom
they appeal in a lawful manner, to try to "balance" these freedoms is an
affront to the freedoms-a contradiction of the very concept of a freedom.
2. Statutes and the creation of derivative rightsfrom freedoms
Now let us leave the common law world and move to what labour lawyers
know all about-collective bargaining legislation. In Ontario, The Ontario
LabourRelations Act 28-in Nova Scotia, The Trade Union Act. 29
At common law we all have the freedom to associate. As we have
seen, that freedom is protected against actions of other private actors by
the general and background "perimeter" of common law rights, which we
all enjoy. (So, again, you cannot send around a bunch of thugs to beat
me up because I have joined a union, because I have tort rights not to be
assaulted-and you have tort duties not to assault me.)
But sometimes, we do protect the exercise of a freedom from
other interference by other private actors with more than just the usual
background system of rights and duties. Sometimes we do construct in our
legislation what I believe are properly called "derivative rights"-i.e. rights
derived from this freedom, for the purposes of protecting the exercise of
that freedom. That is, sometimes we interfere with the freedoms of others
in order to protect workers' freedom to associate. We alter the normal
background rules. We trade off one person's freedom in order to protect
another person's freedom. We alter the world of contending freedoms
by creating rights where none existed before. Labour lawyers are very
familiar with this sort of legal move.
We are now at the stage where we can more fully deploy our statutory
analogy. The foundational provision of the OLRA is s. 5 which reads:
"Every person is free to join a trade union of the person's own choice and

27. Although this case did not directly implicate any constitutional protections, the court saw the
issue in which the law had to "balance" what it called the "values and interests" at stake-freedom of
speech/picketing and freedom to carry on business. (Keep your eye on the way the word balance is
used here-this is a key point.) The correct way to do this, the court held, was not to adopt the Hersees
rule that secondary picketing was always illegal, nor to balance in a more nuanced way via well
accepted legal ideas invented after Hersees such as the "ally doctrine" which aim at a more delicate
balancing.
28. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sch A [OLRA].
29. Trade Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475.
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to participate in its lawful activities."30 I tell my students that the rest of the
OLRA is all just detail in support of s. 5. Section 5, and its Nova Scotia
equivalent, s. 13 of the Trade UnionAct, are what it is "all about."
If all we had was s. 5 then that freedom would, as noted above, be
protected by the normal perimeter of rights and correlative duties. (Again,
you cannot send a bunch of hugs around to beat me up because I have
joined a union.) But s. 5 is not all there is. There is more. Much more.
First, the unfair labour practice provisions from the Trade Union Act:
53(3) No employer and no person acting on behalf of an employer shall
(a) refuse to employ or to continue to employ any person
or otherwise discriminate against any person in regard to
employment or any term or condition of employment, because
the person
(i) is or was a member of a trade union,
53(1) No employer and no person acting on behalf of an employer shall
(a)participatein or interferewith theformation oradministration
of a trade union or the representationof employees by a trade
union;

Then there is the duty to bargain in good faith:
s. 35 Where notice to commence collective bargaininghas been given...
(a) the certified bargaining agent and the employer ...shall,
without delay, ...meet and commence ... to bargain collectively

with one another and shall make every reasonable effort to
conclude and sign a collective agreement;3 1

It is critical to. note the following: these are not part of the normal
background perimeter of rights which happen to protect our freedom to
associate (along with much else), such as my right to not be assaulted.
These statutory provisions construct very specific right/duty relationships
which are not part of the normal set of rules applying to all citizens.
They are rights and duties created specifically to protect this freedom (to
associate) for this particular group (employees). These are rights and are

30. Supra note 28. (1 know that in Nova Scotia the relevant section (13) speaks of a "right." This
in my view speaks to the ease of slippage in our language I spoke of earlier. No matter what the
Act says-conceptually this is a freedom, which is protected by various rights-some created by the
statute itself).
31. Supra note 29.
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properly called "derivative rights"-they are derived from, because they
are necessary to the exercise of, freedom of association.32
Let's start with s. 53(3). Without it, an employer is free to dismiss (with
reasonable notice) an employee who joins a union. Or not to hire such a
person. That is just Christiev. York-at common law we are free to contract
with anyone (or not) for whatever reason we may have, however odious."
The whole point of s. 53 is to alter that legal world-which still holds
for all (almost) other reasons for hiring and firing, and contracting more
generally. It alters the world of formally equal and contending freedoms
which the normal background rules construct. It does so by limiting, most
importantly, the employer's freedom. This is done by granting employees
rights which impose duties on employers. Same with the duty to bargain.3 4

32. We will return to the issue about how we "know" when to create such derivative rights belowbut we all know, see above, the basics of our answer. We create the derivative rights when we know
that the freedom would not be worth the paper it's written on without them. That is, we will have a
sort of test of real necessity-or impossibility-along the lines that "the real exercise of the freedom,
without these derivative rights, is not going to happen, given what we know about the world."
33. See Christie v York Corp, [1940] SCR 139 (a tavern owner defendant was free to refuse to serve
the plaintiff because of his race) [Christie].
34. The s. 53(1) protection is really particularly interesting, as we have seen, because it not only
provides rights to employees to not be subjected to a specific action for a specific reason (i.e. the
s. 53(3) duty to not dismiss an employee for joining a union), but it provides protections from the
impact of certain activities, regardless of the reason for those activities. That is, it creates a "perfect"
or complete protection for the exercise of the freedom-akin to restriction on the state imposed by
constitutional freedoms.
But so too are employee freedoms constrained by the great compromises the Act enforces. Soat common law, both union and employer had the freedom to bargain, and could chose not to entertain
the representations of others, for whatever reason. That's why (at times violent) recognition strikes
occurred in Canada, and still occur elsewhere. (For a particularly gruesome episode in Canada, see
Stan D Hanson's essay "Estevan 193 1" in Irving M Abella, eds, On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in
Canada, 1919-1949 (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975) at 33.) And it was specifically these altercations
that our statutes meant to eradicate by taking away the freedom to strike for recognition and giving
the employees a right to have their unions recognized and bargained with in good faith, attached to a
correlative duty on the employer, all as a means instrumental to the exercise of that freedom. Again
the whole point is to alter the normal distribution of rights and freedoms and for the same reasons.
This is done by converting background freedoms, which merely contend-as in our two restaurants
example-into right/duty relations.
For our purposes it is important to see that what we are doing is creating, by legislative action,
(derivative) rights to protect the freedom. Sometimes "we" do this-and often we do not. In most of the
world of contracting we do not. But in the OLRA-and the Ontario Human Rights Code (RSO 1990,
c H 19)-we express dissatisfaction with the "normal" world of rights and freedoms as expressed
in Christie,supra note 33, where the freedom to contract was complete. (Again, to know when the
"background freedoms" need to be modified, we do need and do have a test.) The fact that we, through
the organs of the state, intervene "positively" by creating rights and duties where only freedoms once
existed does not-as the majority in Fraserseems to think it-magically eliminate the distinction
between rights and freedoms. To the contrary, it highlights the necessity for the distinction because it
is needed to make clear what sort of claim is being made in these cases, the legal test appropriate to
that sort of claim, and the remedy required to satisfy that sort of claim as opposed to others.
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3. The constitution and the creation of derivative rights
Now, we can make our final move-from the statutory world to the
constitutional world. And we come to the payoff for this hard slog through
the lost ideas, and the idea that they are required to make sense of what
our common law and our statutes are up to. With this structure of thought,
made available to us by keeping our eye on our basic ideas, we can see
what is going on in our recent Chartercases on s. 2(d).
First, we now have s. 2(d). What does it add to our common law
freedom to associate, protected by the normal common law background of
rights against private actors, supplemented by our statutory "derivative"
rights against private actors? It is common ground among all constitutional
law scholars that what 2(d) does, at a minimum, is to add to these rights
against private actors a new right against the state-that it not infringe the
freedom as it so dramatically did in B.C. Health, and in our Air Canada
example. This is the easy part."
But now we come to the hard part. The hard part is not when does
s. 2(d) protect us all against state interference with our freedoms. It is,
rather, when does 2(d) protect us against other private actors interfering
with our freedoms?
To put this in a form more natural for Canadian constitutional lawyers:
when does the Charter create, or force legislatures to create, derivative
rights? That is, when is there a constitutional duty on a legislature to pass
laws restricting the freedoms of private actors-mainly employerswhich interfere with worker exercise of their freedom? When is there a
constitutional duty-as opposed to a good legislative idea-to alter the
background rules? When is there what I call a "diagonal" application of
the Charter?
In light of all of the above we can see that the questions in our recent
and famous cases are best seen as follows:
(a) The question in Dunmorewas whether the state was constitutionally
obligated by s. 2(d) of the Charterto create for agricultural workers
s. 53-type, derivative, unfair labour practice rights, against private
actors (employers)? Answer, yes.
(b) The questions in B.C. Health were first, did the state violate
worker freedom of association by tearing up collective agreements
and forbidding future negotiation? Answer, yes. And second, 36

35. But see infra; the Supreme Court of Canada is confusing the easy and the hard part.
36. Amazingly, for it was not and could not be raised in the case for reasons we come to below. It
is for this reason that I treat the case in what follows as primarily about the first question-and not a
derivative rights case.
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whether s. 2(d) required the creation of s. 35-type, derivative, duty
to bargain rights against private actors (i.e. employers). Answer,
yes.
(c) The question in Fraserwas whether the state was constitutionally
obligated by s. 2(d) to create all of the other important rights and
duties of the OLRA (the "Wagner Act Model") beyond ss. 53 and
35 (such as "exclusivity," arbitration, and so on). Answer, at the
Ontario Court ofAppeal, yes, but at the Supreme Court of Canada,
no.
But there is a very real problem lurking here which we are now in a
position to put our finger on. Dunmore/Fraserare derivative rights casesthey ask whether the employees' s. 2(d) freedom obligates the government
to alter the background rules and create legislative derivative rights for
those employees (with correlative and attendant duties on other private
actors-i.e. employers) in order to protect the employees' freedom.
But B.C. Health-like the Trilogy" before it-or now Air Canada or
Canada Post-is not such a case-the claimants there were not alleging
that the state had a duty to intervene to alter the normal background rules
governing the rights and freedoms of other private actors. They were
complaining that the state's legislation limited their freedom.
There is a very important distinction here between Dunmore type
cases and B. C. Health type cases.
Dunmore/Fraserare cases where the claim is that the government
needs to "go to bat for" the freedom by creating derivative rights. (It is a
"going to bat for" the freedom case, or what I will call a GTBF case). We
are asking the state to "protect" the freedom from attacks by other private
actors. Dunmore and Fraserare hard cases.
B.C. Health is not that type of case at all. It is a case where the claim is
that the government has "taken a bat to" the freedom. (It is a "taking a bat
to"-or a TABT-case). It is an easy case. We are simply asking the state
itself to "respect" the freedom."'

37. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [ 1987] 1SCR 313; PSAC v Canada,
[1987] I SCR 424; RWDSU v Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 SCR 460.
38. The language of respect/protect is found in a very familiar set of ideas used in human rights
discourse. Human rights can be: 1. Respected by the state (the state itself must not violate the right or
interfere with the freedom). 2. Protected by the state (the state must intervene to restrain other private
actors (here, primarily, employers) from violating the rights and interfering with the exercise freedoms
of others (here, employees)). 3. Fulfilled, Guaranteed or Promoted by the state (the state must provide,
for example, schools to those with a right to minority language education.) For a nice example of the
use of this typology in a labour law context, see Judy Fudge, "The New Discourse of Labour Rights:
From Social to Fundamental Rights?" (2007) 29 Comp Lab Law & Pol'y J 29.
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B.C. Health is an easy, "Respect," (TABT) case." Dunmore is a hard,
"Protect" (GTBF) case.4 0
Why does this distinction-TABT/Respect vs GTBF/Protect-matter?
Because it is fundamental.
In GTBF cases, in which the state is asked to create a derivative right,
we will, as we have noted above, need a test which marks this sort of
circumstance off from the rest of the world where freedoms are simply left
to compete. 4 1 We need an answer to the question-why is the freedom of
this person (the employer) to be altered, via the imposition of a duty upon
them (i.e. granting a right to the employee)? Why is there a "positive duty

39. See supranote 36 for clarification of this point.
40. This forces us to clarify another conceptual point and confusion which stalks these cases. In
Canada it is said: 1. that the Charter applies to "state action." It does not apply to private actors. And
2. there is, in general, no "positive duty to legislate." What this adds up to is that in Canada, except in
rare cases, all we have is a constitution which "Respects"-and does not "Protect" rights and freedoms
from the exercise by other private actors of their own freedoms. In other constitutional systems the
language used is slightly different and the rules often very different. In Europe, for example, people
distinguish between "vertical" application of constitutions (state-citizen, or "respect" scenarios) and
"horizontal" application (citizen-citizen, or "protect" scenarios). So, to translate, in Canada we have, in
general, only "vertical" application of our Charter-this is just another way of saying we have a "state
action" requirement. Now, what is going on in Dunmore/Fraser,but not B.C. Health, is that we are
creating exceptions to this basic set of constitutional rules which apply "in general." These are cases
where it is argued that the normal rules do not apply. It is argued that it is not enough that the state itself
not interfere with the freedom to associate (i.e. it is not enough the state itself "Respects,".stays out of
the way, or refrains from "taking a bat to" the freedom). It is argued that the state must "Protect" the
exercise of the freedom from the actions of other private actors (i.e. employers). That is, it is argued
that the state must go to bat for the freedom and create "derivative rights" for employees against (with
correlative duties upon) employers. In these cases it is argued that there is a "positive duty" (which
does not exist "in general") to legislate. In Dunmore this argument worked. In Fraserit did not. In B.C.
Health the argument was not made-but it "worked." Note: this does not mean that we have moved
from "vertical" to "horizontal" application of the Charter.The result is not that employers are bound
by the Charter(no direct citizen-citizen application). We are in a sort of half-way house-what we
might call diagonal application of the Charter. Employees cannot sue their employers for interfering
with their freedom to associate, but they (well, at least agricultural workers) can sue the government
for not passing legislation to stop employers from interfering with their freedom to associate.
In a GTBF case, what we are asking is whether or not there is a positive constitutional obligation
on the government to act by providing rights that can be enforced against other private actors. We are
asking whether by not intervening in the contest of freedoms between private parties, the government
has thereby violated a constitutional obligation. Although, in cases like Dunmore, attempts have been
made to suggest that "state action" has limited the freedom, the real culprit is state inaction. On
the contrary, a TABT case is a situation in which, but for the state's intervention, one would not be
prohibited from exercising their freedom in a specific way. So, in B.C. Health, but for the impugned
legislation, individuals would have been free to associate for the purposes of bargaining over a wide
range of important contractual terms. The issue here is that the state has stepped in, and has restricted
the sphere of freedom of union members, because they were bargaining collectively. It is not about
creating a derivative right, but rather about infringing on the freedom to bargain collectively.
41. This is our point about Pepsi-Cola. In that case, the Court rightly decided to simply let the
competing freedoms-the union's freedom to picket, and the claimant's freedom to conduct a business
-compete. In other words, it overturned the erroneous creation of a derivative right (for the employer)
in Hersees.
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to legislate" here and not elsewhere? Why is the normal constitutional
default rule that the only obligation on the state is to "respect" the freedom
not sufficient? Why do we move to diagonal application of the Charterin
this sort of case? 42
Statutory labour law has long had an answer to these questions in the
idea that, because of inequality of bargaining power, employee freedoms
would be empty unless protected by a perimeter of rights that is wider than
the mere normal background tort and contract rights. But does this answer
work for the constitution?
Now this seems to be the sort of test articulated in Dunmore and Fraser
for our constitutional law. Only the test there is extremely stringent under
which only very badly off workers get the benefit. "Ordinary" workers,
RCMP officers, Michelin workers, or even Walmart workers, do not.
So, in Dunmore Justice Bastarache distinguished the agricultural worker
claimants in that case from previous claimants for whom no Charter
remedy was provided, such as the RCMP officers in Delisle,43 on the basis
that previous claimants could not show that the "fundamental freedom at
issue... was impossible to exercise" (emphasis added) without the state
going to bat for the freedom, by creating derivative rights." In Fraser,
the Court reiterates that high standard.
But here is the main point: this is a test which we need only when we
are demanding that the state act by creating derivative rights. It is a test for
the hard, GTBF, protect, cases.
This is not a test, it should be obvious, which has any role at all in
easy, TABT, Respect cases, like B.C. Health. Or Air Canada. The idea
that there is a stringent test of impossibility to be deployed here is very
odd if you think about it. It is inconsistent with our basic understanding of
the Charter. If the government interferes with my freedom of speech-or
religion--or any other freedom-the test is not, has not been, and should
not be, "has the state made it impossible to exercise the freedom"? The test
is, rather, whether the state has interfered with the freedom in a way that
cannot pass s. 1 muster under some version of the Oakes test. 45
This is the fundamental mistake in the majority in Fraser.They say
the protection for collective bargaining all goes back to Dunmore. They
say all the cases are Dunmore type cases. They say that B.C. Health
"follows directly from the principles enunciated in Dunmore."46 They say
42.

On the idea of diagonal application see supra note 40.

43.

Delisle v Canada (Deputy AG), [ 1999] 2 SCR 989.

44.
45.
46.

Dunmore, supra note 9 at para 25.
Rv Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
Fraser,supra note 11 at para 38.
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these are all derivative rights cases. They actually say at numerous points
and for the first time that the right to collective bargaining is merely a
derivative right.47 They say that "(i)n every case, the question is whether
the impugned law or state action has the effect of making it impossible to
act collectively to achieve workplace goals."4 8
This is all very wrong and very confused. We have seen why.4 9
Sections 35 (unfair labour practices), and 53 (duty to bargain) of Section
13 of the Trade Union Act and 2(d) of the Charter are derivative rights.
When someone brings a claim that the government has a constitutional
duty to create such rights-and as a result limits those of someone else, i.e.
the employer's freedoms-we will need and do have a rule that demands
that they show that this is necessary to the realization of the workers'
freedom-or perhaps, as the Court suggests, that it would be impossible to
exercise without the creation of rights.
Sections 5 of the OLRA and 2(d) of the Charter are not derivative
rights. They are not rights. They are freedoms. And they are not derivative.
Of anything. They do not exist as a necessary means or precondition
to some end (as is the case with ss. 35 and 53). They are the end. This
freedom is what it is all about. When the state hobbles, or interferes with,
or constrains the exercise of the freedom in any manner which does not
satisfy s. I we have a constitutional wrong.50

47. Ibid at paras 46, 66.
48. Ibid at para 46 (emphasis added).
49. This is, I believe, and can see now with more clarity, what Justice Fish warned about in his solo
dissent in Baier vAlberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 SCR 673 in connection with s 2(b). See also Jamie
Cameron, "Due Process, Collective Bargaining, and s.2 (d) of the Charter; A Comment on B.C. Health
Services" (2007) 13 CLELJ 323 at 344.
50. In my view, collective bargaining is an activity that is simply doing with others what I am free to
do myself. It is the exercise of the freedom. It is not a means to the exercise of the freedom. So, when
we confuse GTBF/protect cases with TABT/respect cases we are making a large mistake. What we
end up doing is putting a very stringent and totally inappropriate test in the way of our basic freedoms.
This is a very bad-perhaps unthinkable-idea. It will have a large impact in our law.
Here is the implication for the "right"-i.e. freedom-to strike. There is in my view a coherent
account of freedom of association and it is very easy on that account to see how freedom of association
leads to a freedom to collectively bargain and a freedom to strike. (These are two actions I am freed to
take as an individual-therefore Iam free to do them in association with others.) Collective bargaining
is not derivative of freedom of association-it is just freedom of association being exercised in the
workplace. Collective bargaining is associational bargaining; it simply is doing with others what I
am free to do. We do not have collective bargaining because it is conducive to, or promotes, or is a
necessary precondition to, freedom of association. It is just freedom of association in action in the real
world. And legislation directly taking a bat to this freedom, through constraining its exercise by the
operation of law, is an assault on that freedom. So too with striking, and the attempts by legislatures to
prohibit a collective refusal to work without a contract, is an attack on that freedom. These activities
have nothing to with the very important idea of derivative rights. And nothing to do with the stringent
test for their creation.
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When the state interferes with the exercise of any freedom (whether of
speech or religion or thought or association) the question is-"are we free
to do this or not"? and the answer lies in whether the state can justify any
interference with or impact upon the freedom under s. 1." The question is
not "do you, the citizen, really, really need to exercise the freedom"? The
question is supposed to be "does the state really, really, need to interfere
with your exercise of the freedom"? The hidden result of Fraser is to
confuse TABT (Respect) and GTBF (Protect) cases. They are different.
The result of this confusion, the result of treating TABT cases as GTBF
cases, is the setting of the stage for a real evisceration of fundamental
freedoms.
We have lost the distinction between easy and hard constitutional
cases. All the cases are now hard. This is not right.
So here, for example, is the implication of all of this for the Air
Canada and all of the other freedom to strike cases coming our way: If
the freedom to strike, for example, is seen as a "derivative right" caseand thus one afforded to individuals only if they "really, really need it,"
or where depriving them of that freedom would be to make association
"impossible" then we are very unlikely to have meaningful protection of
a fundamental liberty.52
But if we stick to our basic ideas we can see what is going on here
-and change it. There is hope. Recall-this is what Pepsi got right. The
51. In this sense freedoms, because of the "state action/vertical application" rule, always provide
citizens with rights against the state to respect the freedom-i.e. it puts a duty on the state to respect
the freedom. The issue in Dunmore/Fraseris whether the state must also legislate to protect-i.e. to
legislate derivative rights for employees against employers. And in B.C. Health the Court created a
derivative right in case in which it was not - and could not conceptually be-asked to do so because it
was not a Protect case at all, but rather a Respect case.
52. If, however, striking is seen as the exercise of a freedom to do with others what we are free to
do alone, than we have a much more robust and meaningful protection of basic civil liberties, the
deprivation of which by the state will have to be demonstrably justified under s I in order to pass
constitutional scrutiny.
The points made here help identify the nature of the shadow being cast over our law by Fraser.
They will also, I hope, reinforce the important idea that we do not really need all this constitutional
exertion in these cases (which is done so poorly in any event). Rather, we can see that in our statutes
we have already sorted out these difficult issues in a clear way. The only issue really in Fraserwas the
question: why do other workers in Ontario get this package of derivative rights, but not agricultural
workers? Why are they short-changed in the distribution of protection of the fundamental freedom?
That is, why are they treated unequally? In other words, why is this not a Charter s 15 issue? As I
have argued before, that is the real question in these cases and asking that question is the way to avoid
all this unnecessary, very confused, constitutional theorizing by the Supreme Court of Canada (See
Langille, "Freedom of Association Mess", supra note 16 at 204-212). It would get us straight to the
actual complaint and required remedy. The more decisions like Fraserwe have, the more we need to
get this right. The costs of getting it wrong now include, as we have seen, some very real and very
basic constitutional confusions which are of capable of very broad application in our constitutional
law.
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court in that case was prepared to ask the questions we need to ask when
the basic but lost ideas come home-"when do we need derivative rights
(for employers in that case) and when do we leave the contest of freedoms
alone"? And to answer it correctly: "there is, in this case no good reason
to interfere with the contest of freedoms by creating new derivative rights
for employers."
This is very basic. And very important for all of our constitutional law.
We really need to focus on this question-when does the constitution require
the creation of derivative rights-i.e. altering someone else's freedomsto protect my freedoms? And when not. That is a tough question. In seeing
that this was the right question, we got Hersees properly overruled. We are
also able to clearly see what is at stake in Dummore/Fraser.And agree,
or not, whether it was sensibly answered. You might take the view that
the test was applied too stringently-that all workers need derivative
rights protection, not just the especially vulnerable agricultural workers
of Dunmore/Fraser.Or you might take the view of Justice Rothstein in
Fraser" who seems to believe that we should never do this-that we
should never convert contending constitutional freedoms to right/duty
relationships. We also know that we have been answering this question in
our statutes very easily and for a long time. What is the difference between
the statutory version of the question and the constitutional version? These
are issues that confront us in derivative rights/GTBF/respect cases like
Dunmore/Fraser.
But the important point here is that these are not the questions which
confront us in the easy, state violation/TABT/respect cases like B.C.
Health. Or Air Canada. Or the Post Office. When the state is taking a bat
to a fundamental freedom we do not need to worry about when we should
be sacrificing one private actor's freedom for another's. We simply have
private actors' freedoms being infringed by the state-for any one of a
number of reasons-like saving money-or avoiding inconvenience to the
travelling public-or some purely ideological consideration. These are not
good reasons to interfere with the fundamental freedoms of others.

53.

Fraser,supra note 11at para 188-203.
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As we have noted, the fact that others, exercising their freedoms,
have an impact upon us-even a lot of us-is not news. It is not legally
interesting. 54
Why the distinction between constitutionalrights andfreedoms
matters to all Canadians
What we are all interested in is freedom. Real freedom.5 1 In some
extraordinary circumstances agricultural workers argue for the alteration
of the normal and formally equal distribution of legal freedoms of others,
in the name of protecting their fundamental freedoms. We have a very
stringent test in these "going to bat for" the freedom type cases. But
here the issue really is "should we trade freedom for freedom"? And the
claiming private party must meet a strict test-i.e. offer a very powerful
justification for the trade-off of freedoms requested in its favour. The party
arguing for a constitutional limit on the freedom of others meets a high
hurdle.
But, because freedom is what is important we also never let the state
simply take away the freedoms of Canadians-for reasons of convenience,
or ideology, or anything else. Here, in "taking a bat to the freedom cases,"
the test cannot be one with a heavy onus on the citizen. It must rather rest
heavily on the state-i.e. the party seeking to limit the freedom. Frasergets
this very wrong. It reverses the onus in our basic and easy constitutional
cases. It stands Oakes on its head.
B.C. Health was an easy case. So should be the Post Office and Air
Canada strike cases. They are TABT cases. My point is that the Supreme
Court of Canada will make them hard cases by treating them as GTBF
4.

54. If we start to think it is, we will end up in some very odd legal places. Like the following. Irving
shipyards just won the 25 billion dollar contract to build our new Navy ships. This will have, we all
hope, a wonderful effect on the local economy-suppliers, truckers, local restaurants, the real estate
market, car sales and on and on and on. Irving is having a positive impact on all of us-does that mean
they can sue us for the enrichment we will all receive? No-we are enriched but not unjustly. We have
not violated their rights. This is a pretty important point to keep in mind.
Or take the opposite example. The board directors of a large paper company decides to shut
down a plant in Nova Scotia-potentially devastating the local economy (suppliers, truckers, real
estate, car sales, restaurants, and on and on). They do this to maximize shareholder value, that is,
because it is in their interest. Does this mean we can sue them for the losses we have incurred because
of their exercise of their freedom? We know the answer.
There just is a big distinction between our doing something which has an impact on the interests
(positive or negative) of others-and our doing something which violates the rights of others. There
is a critical difference between my exercise of my freedoms and my violating your rights. Impactspositive and negative-and very real are all around us. They are not to be confused with violations of
my rights.
As we have noted, sometimes your very good restaurant can drive my restaurant out of business.
Sometimes it can benefit me-if I own the hotel next door, for example. That is life.
55. See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999).
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cases. They are making it much easier for the state to violate our freedoms
in the absence of a good reason. In B.C. Health and Fraser,they were
mixing up GTBF and TABT cases. They were doing this by either
confusing or jettisoning our very basic ideas. That is very bad news for all
Canadians who value their freedoms. All of our freedoms are at risk if this
confusion continues.
In preparing for this visit back home to Dalhousie I was leafing through
Innis's book-based on his Cambridge thesis-The Liability ofStrikers in
the Law of Tort.56 At the very end of that book-in the very last sentenceInnis makes this same point. While enumerating some of the things he has
not addressed in the book-like essential services strikes-and he writes:
These are matters which are beyond the scope of this [book] but it is
clear that provisions in our law for emergencies and special cases will be
adequate only if they are superimposed on a law that provides rationally
for normal industrial disputes."
That is what I am pleading for. Rationality. Clear thinking. Keeping basic
ideas in play. All in the name of protecting our freedoms. I worry deeply
that that the Supreme Court has made all of this very difficult for us to do. I
am arguing that this needs to be, and can be, put right. That is my argument
for Innis.

56. Innis M Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort (Kingston: Queen's IRC Press,
1967).
57. Ibid at 195.

